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Introduction
Nash equilibrium (hereafter NE) is the most widely accepted game theoretic solution concept in economics. It is not only used by theorists to solve non-cooperative games, but it also provides practitioners with a benchmark to explain behavior observed in the …eld. As we shall see however, the extension of the NE concept to Bayesian games is often analytically intractable. In the present paper, we propose an alternative equilibrium concept that enables one to approximate an analytically intractable NE in a broad class of Bayesian games.
The use of numerical techniques to solve increasingly complex models (e.g. dynamic or general equilibrium models) has now become widespread in economics. These techniques have not only been employed in empirical applications, but they have also been used both as complement and substitute to economic theory. Likewise, numerical approximations have been adopted in the analysis of Bayesian games, and most notably, auctions. Indeed, as discussed later, auction models typically do not possess a closed form solution, except under simplifying but often empirically questionable assumptions. Numerical methods have been used in the analysis of auctions i) to gain insights about the properties of an equilibrium strategy, ii) to estimate complex structural models, and iii) to conduct counterfactual analyses based on structurally estimated parameters.
1 Essentially, two approaches have been proposed to approximate NEs in auction games. The …rst consists in discretizing the action space (e.g. Athey 2001) , while the second consists in solving the set of di¤erential equations generated by the …rst order conditions of the problem (e.g. Marshall et al. 1994 , Li and Riley 1999 , Bajari 2001 . In the present paper, we propose a new method consisting in …nding a solution in a simpli…ed strategy space.
2 As we shall see, two of the most notable advantages of this approach, are that i) beyond auctions, it is applicable to a broad class of Bayesian games, and ii) it enables one to solve even the most complex models.
We de…ne a Constrained Strategic Equilibrium (hereafter CSE) as a NE of a modi…ed game in which strategies are constrained to belong to an appropriate subset typically indexed by an auxiliary parameter vector. We show that any sequence of CSEs has a subsequence that converges toward a NE when the strategy space is compact. The compacity condition is standard in the Bayesian games literature, and it is satis…ed in the class of models for which existence of an equilibrium has been established. The CSE approximation method is therefore relevant in a large number for games of interest to economists.
We also show how the approximation principle may be implemented in practical applications. In particular, the parametrization of the constrained strategies enables one to calculate the CSEs numerically in a broad class of Bayesian games, including complex games without NE in closed form. In addition, we develop several criteria to evaluate in practice the quality of the CSE approximation. Beyond the traditional measures used in numerical analysis, we propose two original criteria with game theoretic interpretation. The …rst criterion compares the CSE to its unconstrained best-response, either in terms of distance or payo¤s. In the second criterion, the CSE is reinterpreted as a NE in a slightly perturbed game. The approximation quality is then evaluated by a measure of the distance between the original and the perturbed games.
Although the CSE approximation may be applied to most Bayesian games, we illustrate its advantages with a series of private-values auction examples. In the …rst example, an independent private-values auction, the NE may be calculated analytically. Therefore, we can illustrate the accuracy of the method by comparing the CSE approximation with the actual NE. In the second example, an asymmetric …rst-price auction, the NE cannot be expressed in closed form, but it may be approximated by other numerical techniques developed speci…cally for such a situation. This asymmetric example therefore gives us the opportunity to compare the CSE approach to existing approximation methods. Finally, we consider a complex multi-unit auction model which, to the best of our knowledge, has never been solved, either analytically or numerically. This last example therefore illustrates how the CSE approximation provides a new tool to analyze games with considerable, but yet still poorly understood, economic implications.
We believe our paper contributes to the existing literature in at least three ways. First, we de…ne formally the CSE concept, and we propose su¢ cient conditions under which a sequence of CSEs converges toward a NE (Section 2). Second, we propose an algorithm to calculate the CSE approximation and evaluate its precision (Section 3). Third, we illustrate the practical relevance of the CSE approach with a series of auction examples, including a complex multi-unit model that cannot be solved with existing numerical techniques (Section 4).
Approximation with Constrained Strategic Equilibria
Before we introduce the model, let us brie ‡y summarize the basic notations used throughout the paper. Sets are denoted with capital letters, while a generic element of a set is denoted with the same lower case letter (e.g. t 2 T ). The subscript i denotes a speci…c player i, while the subscript i refers to the set of all players except i (e.g. t i = (t 1 ; ::; t i 1 ; t i+1 ; ::; t N )). Unless mentioned otherwise, a letter without subscript represents the vector or the Cartesian product across all players of the corresponding individual variable (e.g. t = (t 1 ; ::
Finally, the set f1; :::; N g is denoted by N .
The Model and the Constrained Strategic Equilibrium
We consider a single play of a N -person simultaneous move game. Each player is endowed with a privately known "type" t i , with T i R p compact. The vector of types t is drawn from a joint distribution with cumulative distribution function (hereafter c.d.f.) F (t). Player i selects an action a i , where A i R p 0 denotes the set of possible actions that player i can take. Players are endowed with individual Von Neuman-Morgenstern utility functions U i (a; t). A pure strategy pro…le s consists in N measurable functions transforming signals into actions (a i = s i (t i ) ; 8i 2 N ), and it is said to be feasible if U (s (t) ; t) is integrable with respect to F . We assume in the remainder that S = N i=1 S i is a subset of all feasible strategy pro…les. Finally, fN; F; U; Sg is assumed to be common knowledge.
Following (e.g.) Reny and Zamir (2004) , we adopt the ex-ante formulation of the Bayesian game. 
where b
is the expected utility of player i conditional on his type t i . 4 When possible, the corresponding First Order Conditions (hereafter FOC) are reformulated for each i 2 N as
which typically produces a set of di¤erential equations characterizing the solution. Except under fairly restrictive assumptions whose empirical validity is often questionable (e.g. symmetry, independence, risk neutrality, linearity of the demand or cost functions), it is in general impossible to solve (2.2) analytically. Numerical methods have been proposed in the speci…c context of the …rst-price single-unit asymmetric auction (e.g. Marshall et al. 1994 , Li and Riley 1999 , Bajari 2001 . These methods consist essentially in …nding a solution to the set of di¤erential equations produced by the FOC (2.3). In many complex games however, such as the multi-unit auction example presented in Section 4, these methods are not applicable because the FOC (2.3) cannot be expressed in closed form, or they are too complex to be solved numerically. We now consider an alternative equilibrium concept that enables the approximation of NEs even in the most complex games. The de…nition of a CSE parallels that of a NE in the ex-ante game, except that the strategies are now restricted to constrained sets S k i S i . More formally, S k S k , the set of CSEs in S k , is composed of strategy pro…les s k such that
The CSEs may also be expressed as a …xed point solution of the constrained best-response correspondence
As we shall see in the next section, the determination of this …xed point is greatly simpli…ed under a parametrization of the strategies in S k i . As a result, a CSE may be determined in the most complex Bayesian games, even when the FOC (2.3) characterizing the NEs do not have an explicit expression.
Approximation of Nash Equilibria
We now identify conditions under which a sequence of CSEs converges toward a NE. To this end, we assume in the remainder that S is endowed with an appropriate topology, and we consider a family of constrained sets S
Proposition 2.1. If e U is continuous and if a sequence of CSEs s k k=1!1 has a subsequence with limit s 2 S, then s 2 S .
Proof: see Appendix 1.
U is continuous and there exists a CSE s k 8k > 0, then there exists a NE in S, and any sequence of CSEs s k k=1!1 has a subsequence that converges toward a NE.
Proof: see Appendix 2. The compacity of the strategy space is standard in Bayesian games. In particular, this condition is veri…ed in all Bayesian games for which existence has been established (e.g. Lebrun 1996 , Reny 1999 , Athey 2001 , McAdams 2006 . As a result, Proposition 2.1 applies to a large class of games including several auction models (e.g. …rst-price, asymmetric, all-pay), di¤erent forms of Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies with incomplete information on cost and/or demand, noisy signaling games or search models with incomplete information, and some models with multi-dimensional types and/or actions (e.g. multi-markets oligopoly competition, and multi-units auctions). 6 In practical applications of these games analyt-5 Observe that if a NE s belongs to a constrained set S k , then it also belongs to the set of CSEs S k 0 , 8k 0 k. The traditional independent private-values auction with types uniformly distributed on [0; 1] provides an example of such a situation. Indeed, the unique NE s (t) = t=(N + 1) belongs to any constrained set of polynomial or piecewise linear strategies for k 1. As a result, s is also a CSE in any of these constrained sets. 6 Observe that several of the games mentioned (e.g. the …rst price auction) are often considered "discontinuous", as the utility function U i is not continuous. Nevertheless, Proposition 2.1 may be applied to those games as long as the (unconditional) expected utility function e U is continuous.
ical tractability is often obtained at the expense of more realistic assumptions. By o¤ering the possibility to approximate with arbitrary precision intractable NEs, the CSE approximation technique therefore enables one to analyze these models under richer and empirically more relevant assumptions.
As an example of a general strategy space for which the compacity condition is satis…ed, consider the set of functions of bounded variation. 7 To keep the notations from obscuring the point, let us omit the player's subscript and consider a symmetric Bayesian game in which T = [0; 1] and A = R. Let us denote V (s) = sup
js (t j ) s (t j+1 )j, the total variation of a function s, and consider the BV norm ksk BV = js (0)j + V (s). Then, S v , the closure of S v = fs j ksk BV vg is compact under the norm L 1 for any v 2 R. 8 This set of functions with uniformly bounded variation includes most well de…ned bounded functions such as the continuous monotonic functions over [0; 1], the bounded functions with a countable number of discontinuity points, or the di¤erentiable functions with bounded …rst derivative. In other words, S v includes the set of monotonic bounded strategies considered in many Bayesian games, such as auctions, non-linear pricing models, or Cournot oligopolies.
Finally, we propose a family of constrained strategies which is dense in S v . For a given 2 N, consider S k v , the constrained set of piecewise polynomial strategies
Proof: see Appendix 3.
Numerical Implementation
Although the optimal implementation of the CSE approach is context speci…c, we show in this section how one may evaluate the CSEs in a wide range of games, 7 In Armantier et al. (2004) we propose an even more general strategy space endowed with the Sobolev norm for which we show that the compacity condition is satis…ed. For compactness criteria in di¤erent functional spaces see also Dör ‡er, Feichtinger, and Gröchenig (2002) . 8 A proof of this statement is given by (e.g.) Ziemer (1989) including games without closed form NE. We also develop a set of criterion to evaluate the approximation quality in practical applications.
Numerical Determination of the CSEs
To start, consider a family of parametrized constrained strategies:
is a function of …nal dimension. This parametrization provides a major computational advantage as the determination of a CSE reduces to …nding d k 2 D k solving the system of non-linear equations @ @d
The expected utility functions in (3.1) are often di¢ cult (if not impossible) to express analytically even when s i d k i ; t i has a simple functional form. In other words, the system of non-linear equations (3.1) must typically be solved numerically. We di¤erentiate two cases.
Continuous Games:
, we can approximate the integrals in (3.1) with standard Monte Carlo techniques. For instance, one can simply replace the expected utility by its empirical analog e U M i
where e t m denotes hereafter a vector of N random types generated from F , and M is the size of the Monte Carlo approximation. In practice, one may reduce considerably the computational burden by selecting a family of constrained strategies such that
Discontinuous Games : Consider the class of games in which actions may be ranked according to a scoring rule (a i ) 2 R, and the highest score wins and takes all. Such games include auctions, Bertrand oligopolies, or patent race models. The utility functions may then be written
is the indicator function, and V i is the utility function of player i when she wins the game. A general approach to evaluate the CSE in discontinuous games consists in approximating the expected utility with
where G i , the c.d.f. of i , represents the probability that player i wins the game. In most applications G i cannot be calculated analytically and needs to be approximated by simulations. For instance, G i may be replaced by a nonparametric approximation of the form
; e t j;m , K denotes an arbitrary c.d.f., M is the Monte Carlo size, and h is a "bandwidth" controlling the smoothness of the kernel. Horowitz (1992) shows that when the derivative of K is a second order kernel, and h _ M 1 5 , one can make b G i arbitrarily close to G i by selecting M su¢ -ciently large. Therefore, an accurate approximation of a NE may be systematically achieved since we fully control the Monte Carlo sizes M and M .
The computational burden may be greatly reduced when the scoring rule and the strategies are monotonic. Indeed, the system of FOC in (3.1) may then be written for all i 2 N E @ @d
is the expectation with respect to t i conditional on t i , and f i is the marginal distribution of t i . Once again, the expectations in (3.5) may be approximated with arbitrary precision by simulations, and the computational burden may be reduced considerably by choosing an appropriate family of constrained strategies.
Approximation Criteria
In this section, we propose several criteria to evaluate how well a CSE in S k approximates a NE. Our objective is not to study the exact theoretical properties of each criterion. Instead, we intend to provide practitioners with a set of tools that will allow them to decide in practical applications when to stop the approximation procedure consisting in calculating CSEs in expanding constrained sets S k . These approximation criteria therefore complement the algorithm just presented to form a fully implementable numerical approximation technique.
In numerical analysis, an approximation procedure typically stops when the approximate solution or the objective function does not change signi…cantly from an iteration to the next. In the present context, these stopping rules are de…ned as
where B is the FOC operator de…ned in (2.3). Note that C 1 (k) is directly related to Proposition 2.1 stating that when a sequence of CSEs converges, its limit is a NE. We now propose two additional classes of criteria with game theoretic interpretation. Although not implementable in all games, these criteria are particularly relevant as they represent natural measures from a game theoretic perspective of the quality of a NE approximation.
The Unconstrained Best-Response to a CSE
To keep the notations from obscuring the point, suppose that the game under consideration is such that the unconstrained best-response operator is a continuous function. Let us also denote BR (s) the vector of dimension N , whose i th component represents player i ex-ante unconstrained best-response strategy in S i , when her opponents play s i :
The approximation quality may then be evaluated by C 3 (k) = s k BR s k , the distance between the CSE and its unconstrained best-response in S.
9 Moreover,
is the highest bene…t player i can expect when she deviates from her CSE strategy s k i . An alternative measure of the CSE approximation quality is then given by C 4 (k) = e U k .
In most games, the ex-ante best-response does not have an explicit solution. Nevertheless, the criteria C 3 (k) and C 4 (k) may be approximated in general situations by:
where the action a i;m = ArgM ax
; e t i;m ; e t i;m 0 is player i's interim best-response when she receives the private signal e t i;m and her opponents use the strategy pro…le s k i .
The CSE as a NE of a Neighboring Game
Before presenting the criterion, let us introduce some necessary notations. To simplify, let us denote (F ), the Bayesian game characterized by fN; F; U; Sg. Let F be the set of c.d.f. with common support T . Let us also generalize the notation S (F ) to denote the set of NEs in the game (F ). The inverse correspondence S 1 is then such that s is a NE in the game (F s ) for any c.d.f. F s 2 S 1 (s ). Finally, let us assume that the game under consideration is such that S (F ) is a continuous function with respect to a given topology (e.g. L p or Sobolev). Note that the continuity assumption may be interpreted as a stability condition imposed on the game in the sense that slight perturbations of the types' distribution generate neighboring NEs. 10 We can now characterize the last approximation criterion. Consider a game (F ) where F 2 F, and s k a CSE in S k . An alternative measure of the distance between the CSE and a NE is given by
In other words, a CSE may be considered a good approximation of a NE when C 5 (k) is close to zero, since in that case s k is not only a CSE in (F ), but it is also a NE in a virtually identical game (F s k ).
The computation of S 1 might be far from trivial in practice. One may however apply standard econometric techniques to approximate F s k in a given parametric class.
11 For instance, consider a symmetric game and a family of distributions F (: j ) parametrized by a vector 2 R q with q < N . Let us denote 0 the true parameter characterizing the game's distribution F (: j 0 ), 10 The continuity of S (F ) is veri…ed in several Bayesian games. In particular, Lebrun (2002) shows that the equilibrium bid function is continuous in the types's distribution in the symmetric …rst-price private-values auction. Lebrun (2002) also shows that this result extend to asymmetric …rst-price private-values auction when the players'types have common support.
11 It is important to understand that the objective here is not to estimate the unknown structural parameters of the game (as in e.g. Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong 2000) , but rather to apply econometric techniques to address a game theoretic problem. Note in particular that no sample of observations is involved in the calculation of the criterion, as it relies only on simulated types. and s 0 the corresponding NE we wish to approximate. The FOC characterizing a NE may be used as moment conditions to characterize the parameter 1 that makes the CSE s k a NE in the game with distribution F (: j 1 ). Indeed, observe that the FOC in (2.3) are veri…ed for any t i 2 T i . Therefore, we can write the moment conditions E 1 B s k (t i ) = 0, where E 1 denotes the unconditional expectation when the types'distribution is set to F (: j 1 ). The method of simulated moments estimator of 1 is based upon the empirical counterpart of this orthogonality condition:
where e t m is a vector of N types simulated from the distribution F (: j ), and is a symmetric de…nite positive matrix that may be chosen in order to improve the quality of the estimation. The criterion C 5 (k) may then be replaced by a similar measure C 
Examples
The object of this section is to illustrate the relevance of the CSE approximation method through di¤erent examples. To do so, we consider an auction model proposed by Reny (1999) . There are four risk-neutral bidders competing for L units of a homogenous good. Bidder i receives a bi-dimensional type t i = (t i;1 ; t i;2 ) according to a continuous distribution function F i with support [0; 1] 2 . Each bidder is assumed to have strictly decreasing marginal values for the successive units. More speci…cally, bidder i marginal valuation for the l th unit of the good is t i;1 (t i;2 ) l 1 . The type t i;1 may be interpreted as the value allocated by bidder i to the …rst unit of the good, while t i;2 represents a discount factor applied to additional units. Knowing only his own type, bidder i submits a nonnegative sequence of bids s i (t i ) = (s i;1 ; ::; s i;L ), verifying s i;1 ::: s i;L . The L highest bids among the LN submitted are winning bids, with ties broken equiprobably. The auction belongs to the class of discriminatory payment mechanisms, as winning bidders pay the seller their winning bid for each unit won. Reny (1999) proves that this Bayesian game possesses a NE in pure and nondecreasing strategy. The set of admissible strategy pro…les S may then be restricted to the non-decreasing strategies de…ned over the support [0; 1] 2 and verifying s(0) = 0. As explained in Section 2, S is then compact, and any strategy pro…le in S may be approximated with arbitrary precision by a piecewise linear function. In other words, we know that any converging sequence of piecewise linear CSEs we can construct, converges toward a NE of the game. 
First-Price Independent Private-Values Model
Consider …rst the case L = 1, and let us assume that the private-values t i = t i;1 are scalars independently drawn from a Beta distribution with parameters (3; 3). In this traditional …rst-price independent private-values model, the NE has a wellknown closed form solution. We are therefore in a position to compare the actual NE, with its CSE approximation. We consider here a piecewise linear family of constrained strategies of the form:
where d The actual NE as well as the di¤erent piecewise linear CSEs for k varying from one to …ve are plotted in Figure 1 . 15 This …gure illustrates the rapid convergence of the sequence of CSE as k increases. Observe in particular that the approximations for k 4 are virtually indistinguishable from the NE. This observation is con…rmed by the di¤erent approximation criteria reported in Table 1 . In particular, the criteria C 1 (k) and C 2 (k) attest to the rapid convergence of the CSE as k increases. Criteria C 3 (k) and C 4 (k) indicate that, with k as low as three, there is very little di¤erence between the CSE and its unconstrained best-response, both in terms of distance and expected pro…t. 16 Finally, criterion C 5 (k) con…rms that a CSE rapidly becomes a NE in a virtually identical game (i.e. with an almost identical distribution).
Since we know the actual NE in this example, we can also calculate the mean square error, as well as the di¤erence in expected pro…t between the NE and the di¤erent CSEs. As indicated at the bottom of Table 1 , these two additional criteria con…rm that the CSE approach provides accurate approximations. Moreover, we report in Table 2 the expected pro…t and the probability of winning of a representative bidder when using the NE, or the polynomial CSE with k = 5. As expected, the CSE approximation is so accurate, that the economic outcomes of the auction are virtually indistinguishable.
Asymmetric First-Price Auction
We now turn to a single-unit asymmetric …rst-price private-values auction. As in the previous example, the …rst two bidders draw their values from a Beta (3; 3), with mean and standard deviation equal to 0:5 and 0:19. Bidders 3 and 4 on the other hand, receive their types from a more favorable distribution, a Beta (5; 3), with mean and standard deviation equal to 0:625 and 0:16. This asymmetric auction model does not possess a NE in closed form. As previously mentioned, the FOC in this model produce an explicit set of di¤erential equations that may be solved numerically. This example therefore gives us the opportunity to compare the CSE approach with the di¤erential equations method proposed by e.g. Marshall et al. (1994) , Li and Riley (1999) , and Bajari (2001) .
We plot in Figure 2 the piecewise linear CSE for k = 5, as well as the NE approximation obtained with the di¤erential equations method. The shapes of the bid functions indicate that the bidders with the less favorable type distribution must compensate by bidding slightly more aggressively. Although subtle, this di¤erence in behavior has serious economic implications. Indeed, we can see in Table 2 that bidders 3 and 4 are twice as likely to win the auction, and their pro…ts are nearly 2:4 time larger.
Figure 2 also indicates that the CSE and the di¤erential equations methods produce nearly identical results, except possibly for very low types. The approximation quality may be compared more formally in Table 1 where the approximation criteria, although all very close to zero, are slightly larger for the di¤erential equations approximation. In other words, the piecewise linear CSEs appear to provide a slightly more accurate approximation in the sense that i) they are closer to their unconstrained best-responses, and ii) they are NEs in slightly less perturbed games. Precision however, is only one of the components that one may take into consideration when selecting an approximation technique. In many empirical applications, computational speed is also a key concern. As indicated in the last column of Table 1 , we …nd that the piecewise linear CSE is nearly 6 time faster than the competing di¤erential equations method. 17 In other words, the CSE approach appears to perform better in this example, not only in terms of accuracy, but also in terms of computational speed.
Multi-Unit Private-Values Auction
We now consider the case N = L = 4. In other words, we have four bidders competing for four units of a homogenous good in a …rst-price discriminatory private-values auction. We consider here a symmetric case in which the value of the …rst unit is independently distributed across bidders from a Beta(3; 3). The discount factor t i;2 is assumed to be independently drawn across bidders from a normal distribution N (0:75; 0:15) truncated on [0; 1]. The di¢ culties in solving such a multi-unit auction model emerge not only from the fact that types and bids are multi-dimensional, but also from the constraint that bids for successive units must be non-increasing. In fact, to the best of our knowledge, this model has not previously been solved in the literature. 18 In particular, the di¤erential 17 The comparison consisted in calculating the approximated asymmetric equilibrium for 10 6 di¤erent private-values. Note also that once the CSE has been evaluated, the marginal cost of computing the approximated NE for an additional vector of private types is virtually zero. Indeed, it only requires calculating a simple piecewise linear function.
18 Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998) propose an algorithm in the speci…c case of a symmetric discriminatory auction with only two units, and implement it with uniformly distributed types.
equations approach cannot be implemented here, as the FOC of the model cannot be expressed explicitly. The practical relevance of such a multi-unit auction model however, is undeniable. Indeed, it provides the means to analyze some of the auctions with the most considerable, but yet still poorly understood, economic implications such as treasury, electricity or spectrum auctions.
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A strategy in this multi-unit example is a function of three variables l, t i;1 , and t i;2 , where l = 1; :::; 4 represents the successive bids submitted by bidder i for each of the four units for sale. Therefore, to approximate the intractable NE, we generalize the constrained strategy in (4:1) to three dimensional piecewise linear functions in (l; t i;1 ; t i;2 ). The symmetric bid functions calculated for the mean discount factor t i;2 are plotted in Figures 3. This …gure provides us with a unique insight into equilibrium behavior in such multi-unit environments. Indeed, Figure  3 indicates that, although the shape of the bid functions are somewhat similar to the single unit case (Figure 1) , participants tend to bid less aggressively when given the possibility to win several units. Finally, note that the approximation criteria in Table 1 suggest that the CSE approach still provides an excellent approximation even in this complex multi-unit auction.
Discussion
Because it enables the economist to solve rich and empirically relevant models without consideration for analytical tractability, the CSE approach has recently been adopted in the theoretical and empirical analysis of several complex Bayesian games. In particular, Armantier et al. (1998) analyze a procurement from the French aerospace industry, in which the good for sale is allocated to the player bidding the highest ratio of quality over price. Eklöf (2005) applies the CSE approach to estimate the social cost implied by the ine¢ cient allocation of contracts in …rst-price sealed-bid procurement auctions with asymmetric bidders. Likewise, Sbaï (2006, 2007) apply the CSE approach to study Treasury auction models accounting for supply uncertainty, as well as possible informational and risk aversion asymmetries across bidders. The CSE approach has also generated interest in the …eld of arti…cial intelligence. For instance, Arunachalam and Sadeh (2003) , and Estelle et al. (2005) use a CSE approximation to study strategic interactions in a supply chain game. Likewise, Reeves and Wellman (2004) , as well as Mackie-Mason and Wellman (2006) , advocate the use of the CSE approach to solve in…nite Bayesian games.
In contrast with the applications just mentioned, the contribution of the present paper is to provide the methodological foundations of the CSE approximation method. More speci…cally, we de…ned formally a constrained strategic equilibrium, and we established su¢ cient conditions under which a sequence of CSEs converges toward a NE. In addition, we provided a fully implementable algorithm to calculate the CSE approximations numerically in a broad class of Bayesian games. Finally, we illustrated the advantages of the CSE approach with di¤erent auction examples, including a multi-unit auction which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been previously solved. It has to be noted, however, that the range of applications of the CSE method is not limited to auctions. Indeed, the approximation theorem and the algorithm introduce in the paper are directly applicable in a wide range of Bayesian games relevant to economists (e.g. principal-agent, non-linear pricing, adverse selection or moral hazard models) for which closed form NE may be obtained at best under strong simplifying assumptions. 
